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To accomplish this goal, it is necessary, for starters, 
to identify several basic principles of Fourth Amend-
ment and qualifi ed immunity law. Section 1983 Fourth 
Amendment claims challenging arrests, searches, and 
uses of force by law enforcement offi cers are normally 
governed by an objective reasonableness standard. For 
example, an offi cer has probable cause for an arrest 
when based upon the facts and circumstances known 
to the offi cer, a reasonably prudent person could have 
concluded that the suspect committed or is committing 
a crime.6 Probable cause is essentially a reasonableness 
standard.7 Similarly an offi cer’s use of force in carrying 
out an arrest or investigatory stop will comport with 
the Fourth Amendment if, under all of the circum-
stance facing the offi cer, it was objectively reasonable.8 
Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness 
standards give substantial deference to the judgment 
of the law enforcement offi cer.9 Furthermore, an offi cer 
who violated the Fourth Amendment because she did 
not act in an objectively reasonable manner may still 
escape personal liability under qualifi ed immunity. 
This is so even though the qualifi ed immunity stan-
dard itself is one of objective reasonableness.10 Thus, 
a law enforcement offi cer who violated the §1983 
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights will be shielded 
from liability unless those rights were clearly estab-
lished when the offi cer acted. Liability will attach only 
if the offi cer violated the plaintiff’s clearly established 
Fourth Amendment rights.
This means that a law enforcement offi cer sued 
under §1983 for violating the Fourth Amendment is 
effectively granted two levels of reasonableness protec-
tion, one under the Fourth Amendment and another 
under qualifi ed immunity. To recover damages on a 
§1983 Fourth Amendment claim the plaintiff has to 
overcome both levels of reasonableness protection. 
This is because an offi cer found to have acted unrea-
sonably for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
could nevertheless be found to have acted reasonably 
for the purpose of qualifi ed immunity.11 To avoid the 
linguistic awkwardness of an offi cer having acted “rea-
sonably unreasonably,” courts normally prefer differ-
ent language, for example, that the offi cer had “argu-
able probable cause,” or made a “reasonable mistake,” 
or used force at the “hazy border” of reasonable and 
unreasonable force.12
Prior to its decision in Millender the controlling 
Supreme Court precedent on the immunity of offi cers 
who apply for warrants was Malley v. Briggs.13 The 
The Civil Rights Act 
of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983, 
affords a judicial remedy to 
individuals who suffered 
deprivations of their federal 
constitutional rights under 
color of state law. The §1983 
remedy, however, is subject 
to an array of immunity 
and other defenses. Offi cials 
who carried out a judicial, 
prosecutorial or legislative 
function are protected from 
personal monetary liability by absolute immunity.1 
Offi cials who carried out executive and administrative 
functions are protected by qualifi ed immunity.2
Qualifi ed immunity shields state and local law 
enforcement offi cers from personal monetary liability 
under §1983 so long as the offi cer acted in an objec-
tively reasonable manner. An offi cer will be found to 
have acted in a reasonable manner so long as she did 
not violate clearly established federal law.3 Thus, an of-
fi cer who acted unconstitutionally, but did not violate 
the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights, 
will be protected from liability by qualifi ed immunity. 
Although less potent than the absolute immunities, 
qualifi ed immunity is a very formidable defense and 
“protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.’”4 
The United States Supreme Court in Messerschmidt 
v. Millender5 held that police offi cers who sought and 
executed a very broad warrant authorizing them to 
search a residence for guns and gang related mate-
rial were protected by qualifi ed immunity. The Court 
assumed that the warrant violated the Fourth Amend-
ment, yet found that the offi cers acted in an objectively 
reasonable manner. The Court relied heavily upon the 
facts that the warrant was issued by a neutral magis-
trate, and the offi cers who applied the warrant secured 
approval for it from their superior offi cers. Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the 
Court. Justice Stephen Breyer fi led a brief concurrence. 
Justice Elena Kagan concurred in part and dissented 
in part. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. My major purpose here 
is to analyze the signifi cance of the decision in Mil-
lender upon §1983 Fourth Amendment claims asserted 
against state and local law enforcement offi cers who 
apply for and enforce warrants.
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al merits—in Millender whether the warrant violated 
the Fourth Amendment—or to bypass the merits and 
jump right to the immunity question of whether the 
defendant offi cer violated clearly established federal 
law.18 The Court in Millender took this latter course 
and proceeded directly to qualifi ed immunity. In other 
words, the Court did not decide whether the warrant 
was valid, but held that even if it was invalid, the of-
fi cers who applied for and executed it were protected 
by their immunity defense.
The Court acknowledged that under Malley v. 
Briggs the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant was not 
dispositive of the defendant offi cers’ qualifi ed immu-
nity defense. The Court, however, articulated greater 
weight to the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant than 
appears to have been contemplated by Malley. The 
Millender Court ruled that “[w]here the alleged Fourth 
Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pur-
suant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate 
has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the 
offi cers acted in an objectively reasonable manner [i.e.,] 
in objective good faith.’”19 At another point in his opin-
ion Chief Justice Roberts went even further, stating:
The question…is not whether the 
magistrate erred in believing there was 
suffi cient probable cause to support 
the scope of the warrant he issued, 
[but] whether the magistrate so obvi-
ously erred that any reasonable offi cer 
would have recognized the error. The 
occasions in which this standard will 
be met may be rare, but so too are the 
circumstances in which it will be ap-
propriate to impose personal liability 
on a lay offi cer in the face of judicial 
approval of his actions.20
The Court has thus informed the legal world in 
no uncertain terms that §1983 plaintiffs who challenge 
magistrate issued warrants will be able to overcome 
qualifi ed immunity only in “rare” cases. This is very 
strong medicine indeed! And that is not all. There is 
more in this opinion for which state and municipal law 
enforcement offi cers should be grateful. As discussed 
below, the line offi cers were afforded an additional 
dose of qualifi ed immunity protection for having se-
cured approval from superior offi cers. 
Although Malley v. Briggs recognized that in some 
circumstances a magistrate’s issuance of a warrant will 
not shield the law enforcement offi cer from liability, 
none of the “Malley exceptions” applied in Millender. 
For example, it could not be said that the affi davit 
in support of the warrant was so lacking in probable 
cause that an offi cer’s reliance on the warrant was 
plainly unreasonable.21 Nor was the warrant obviously 
defi cient on its face. The Millender Court distinguished 
Groh v. Ramirez22 on the ground that the warrant’s fail-
Malley Court held that law enforcement offi cers who 
were sued under §1983 for applying for arrest war-
rants were not protected by absolute immunity, even 
though the magistrate who issued the warrant was 
shielded by absolute judicial immunity. The offi cers, 
however, were entitled to assert qualifi ed immunity. 
The Malley Court stated that the pertinent qualifi ed 
immunity question “is whether a reasonably well-
trained offi cer in [the defendant offi cer’s] position 
would have known that his affi davit failed to establish 
probable cause and that he should not have applied 
for the warrant.”14 Although a magistrate’s issuance of 
a warrant does not automatically establish the offi cer’s 
protection under qualifi ed immunity, “[o]nly where 
the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of prob-
able cause as to render offi cial belief in its existence 
unreasonable…will the shield of immunity be lost.”15 
Malley dealt specifi cally with arrest warrants, but its 
rationale applies fully to applications for search war-
rants as well.16
With this background in place we are ready to 
tackle Messerschmidt v. Millender. After a romantic re-
lationship between Shelly Kelly and Jerry Ray Bowen 
turned sour, Bowen physically assaulted Kelly and 
fi red a sawed-off shotgun at her car. Ms. Kelly in-
formed the police about this abuse, and told Detective 
Messerschmidt that she thought Bowen was staying 
at the home of his foster mother, Augusta Millender. 
After confi rming Bowen’s connection to Ms. Millen-
der’s residence, and that Bowen was a member of two 
gangs, Detective Millender obtained approvals from 
his supervisors and a deputy district attorney to seek 
a warrant to search the Millender residence for guns, 
ammunition and gang related material. The magistrate 
issued the warrant, and the search uncovered Augusta 
Millender’s shotgun and ammunition.
Ms. Millender (and her daughter and grandson) 
brought suit in federal court under §1983 against De-
tective Messerschmidt and other offi cers who applied 
for and executed the search warrant. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the warrant did not comport with the 
Fourth Amendment because “there was no basis to 
search for all guns simply because the suspect owned 
and had used a sawed off shotgun [in the shooting of 
Ms. Kelly], and no reason to search for gang material 
because the shooting at the ex-girlfriend for call[ing] 
the cops was solely a domestic dispute.”17 The offi cers 
asserted qualifi ed immunity. 
The United States Supreme Court defi ned the is-
sue as whether, assuming that the warrant was invalid 
and thus should not have been issued, the offi cers 
who applied for and executed it were protected by 
qualifi ed immunity because they acted in an objec-
tively reasonable manner. When a §1983 defendant 
asserts the defense of qualifi ed immunity, a court has 
discretionary authority to fi rst decide the constitution-
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fi ed immunity defense in a particular case can gener-
ate signifi cant judicial disagreement. Justice Kagan, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, sharply 
disagreed with the Court’s reliance on the defendant 
offi cers securing approval from their superior and a 
deputy district attorney. She stressed that all of these 
public offi cials are “teammates,” i.e., part of the same 
prosecution team and, therefore, should not be able to 
confer qualifi ed immunity on each other.31 She found 
the offi cers protected by qualifi ed immunity to the 
extent the warrant authorized a search for fi rearms, 
but not with respect to its authorization to search for 
gang material. Like Justice Kagan, Justice Sotomayor 
(joined by Justice Ginsburg) thought it is “passing 
strange to immunize an offi cer’s conduct…based upon 
the approval of other police offi cers and prosecutors…. 
Under the majority’s test four wrongs [i.e., magistrate, 
prosecutor, superior police offi cer, and line police of-
fi cers] apparently make a right.”32 Justice Sotomayor 
would have rejected the offi cers’ qualifi ed immunity 
defense en toto. Thus, while the Court granted the 
offi cers qualifi ed immunity, Justice Kagan would have 
granted them only partial qualifi ed immunity, while 
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg would have denied 
them immunity altogether. 
When all of the pieces of the Messerschmidt v. 
Millender immunity puzzle are viewed together, the fol-
lowing picture emerges:
1. The defendant law enforcement offi cer starts 
out with two levels of reasonableness protec-
tion, one under the Fourth Amendment, and an 
added level under qualifi ed immunity.
2. The offi cer gets another healthy layer of pro-
tection from the fact that a neutral magistrate 
issued the warrant.
3. If the line offi cer secured approval from a 
superior or an offi cial with legal expertise (e.g., 
an assistant district attorney), that will further 
support the conclusion that the offi cer acted in 
an objectively reasonable manner. 
4. In evaluating the immunity defense, the Su-
preme Court draws no distinction between of-
fi cers who applied for a warrant and those who 
executed it.
State and local law enforcement offi cers should be 
elated with the Court’s decision. On the other side of 
the equation, this is not a pretty picture for §1983 plain-
tiffs who seek to recover damages based upon either 
the application or execution of an allegedly unconsti-
tutional warrant. It puts them behind the eight ball, as 
they face the uphill battle of attempting to overcome 
these various layers of immunity protection. It is not 
impossible, but it will take a mighty strong case, like 
Groh v. Ramirez,33 where the search warrant was obvi-
ure in that case to describe the person or property to be 
seized was a “‘glaring defi ciency’” that rendered the 
warrant invalid on even a “cursory reading” of it.23 
By contrast to Groh v. Ramirez, in Millender even if 
the offi cers were mistaken that the scope of the war-
rant was supported by probable cause, their conclu-
sion was not unreasonable. As to the search for guns, 
“given Bowen’s possession of one illegal gun, his gang 
membership, his willingness to use the gun to kill 
someone, and his concern about the police, a reason-
able offi cer could conclude that there would be addi-
tional illegal guns among others that Bowen owned.”24 
As to the search for evidence of “gang material,” “[a] 
reasonable offi cer could certainly view Bowen’s attack 
[on Kelly] as motivated not by the souring of his ro-
mantic relationship with Kelly but instead by a desire 
to prevent her from disclosing details of his gang activ-
ity to the police.”25 In other words, the Court gave all 
benefi ts of doubt to the defendant offi cers. 
That still leaves the most important aspect of the 
Court’s decision. The lower federal courts have been 
struggling with whether, in evaluating a qualifi ed 
immunity defense, weight should be given to the fact 
that the defendant offi cer sought advice of counsel or 
approval from a superior offi cer before engaging in 
the contested conduct and, if so, how much weight to 
afford.26 As a matter of fi rst impression in the United 
States Supreme Court, the Millender Court held that 
the “fact that the offi cers sought and obtained approv-
al of the warrant application from a superior provides 
further support for the conclusion that the offi cer could 
reasonably have believed that the scope of the war-
rant was supported by probable cause.”27 At another 
point the Chief Justice said that this factor “is certainly 
pertinent in assessing whether [the defendant offi cers] 
could have a reasonable belief that the warrant was 
supported by probable cause.”28 The Court did not 
decide how much weight should be given to this fac-
tor, but, in the author’s view, the tenor of the Court’s 
opinion (“certainly pertinent”) indicates that it may 
well be a signifi cant factor. How signifi cant this factor 
is will likely depend upon the facts and circumstances 
of the particular case, for example, the thoroughness 
of the information the defendant gave her superior, 
the fi rmness of the superior’s approval, the supervi-
sor’s hierarchal position, and whether the superior 
possessed legal expertise.29 In other words, it must be 
determined whether reliance on a superior’s approval 
or advice of counsel was reasonable.30
The Court’s decision in Millender may well encour-
age more line offi cers to seek approval from their supe-
riors. This, of course, would be a good thing. The legal 
question will then become the impact of that approval 
on the line offi cer’s qualifi ed immunity defense. 
The various opinions of the justices in Millender v. 
Messerschmidt illustrate that application of the quali-
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